The planner's subjective destitution: towards a hysterical-analytical triad of planning theory-research-practice by Castillo Ulloa, Ignacio
Raumforschung und Raumordnung | Spatial Research and Planning, 2019; 77(2): 181–198
Beitrag / Article Open Access
Ignacio Castillo Ulloa*
 Open Access. © 2019 Ignacio Castillo Ulloa, published by Sciendo.  This work is licensed under the Creative Commons 
Attribution NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
The planner’s subjective destitution: towards 
a hysterical-analytical triad of planning theory-
research-practice
https://doi.org/10.2478/rara-2019-0009 
Eingegangen: 13. April 2018; Angenommen: 29. Januar 2019
*Corresponding author: Ignacio Castillo Ulloa, Ph.D., Technische Universität Berlin, Institut für Stadt- und Regionalplanung, Fachge-
biet Städtebau und Siedlungswesen, Ernst-Reuter-Platz 1 | BH 5-1, 10587 Berlin, Deutschland, E-mail: i.castillo-ulloa@isr.tu-berlin.de 
Abstract: In this article, I set out different relationships between planning theory, research and practice, drawing on 
Lacan’s “production of four discourses”. I argue that each element of the planning theory-research-practice ‘triad’ 
acts as the discursive ‘agent’ and gives rise to particular kinds of ‘subject-planner’ (the ‘master’, the ‘expert’, the 
‘idealistic’ and the ‘pragmatic’) with specific ideological upshots (‘hidden’ big other, ‘feigned’ big other, hysteria and 
subjective destitution). Primarily a theoretical discussion, the article is also partially underpinned by my own practical 
experience in planning. While Lacanian psychoanalytical theory has already entered the planning field, its deployment 
has been mostly centred on deconstructing both planning decision-making processes and the mediation of planners 
in creating and implementing plans. Hence, the attempt here is to look in more depth at the ‘ambivalent’ role of the 
planner as well as to bring in ‘planning research’, as a key, somewhat occluded, element within the discussion on 
bridging planning theory and practice. Further, in the literature there seems to be a sort of omnipresent assumption 
that ‘valid’ reflection on planning can only come from the ‘outside’, which in turn perpetuates the role of the academic 
researcher simply trying to decode and analyse what the practitioner does (or tries to do). Critical impressions from 
those ‘out there’, ‘on the job’, are still missing. They, far from mere anecdotic accounts, ought to comprise self-
inflicted criticism triggered by a sense of discomfort with what’s being done – by the hysterical question of “why am 
I a planner?” and “why I am doing this or that?”
Keywords: Planning theory, psychoanalytical theory, Lacan, discourse, uncertainty
Zusammenfassung: Ausgehend von Lacans „Produktion von vier Diskursen“, arbeitet der Beitrag verschiedene 
Beziehungen zwischen Planungstheorie, Forschung und Praxis heraus. Das Hauptargument des Artikels ist, dass jedes 
Element der ‚Planungstriade‘ aus Theorie-Forschung-Praxis als diskursiver ‚Agent‘ wirkt und somit bestimmte Arten 
von ‚Subjekt-Planer‘ (der ‚Meister‘, der ‚Experte‘, der ‚Idealist‘ und der ‚Pragmatiker‘) mit spezifischen ideologischen 
Ergebnissen (der versteckte große Andere, der vorgetäuschte große Andere, Hysterie und subjektive Destitution) 
hervorbringt. Die theoretischen Diskussionen des Beitrags wurden durch meine eigenen praktischen Erfahrungen in der 
Planung inspiriert. Obwohl die psychoanalytische Theorie von Lacan bereits in das Feld der Planung eingeführt wurde, 
konzentrierte sich ihre Anwendung hauptsächlich auf die Dekonstruktion von sowohl Planungsentscheidungsprozessen 
wie auch der Vermittlung von Planern bei der Erstellung und Umsetzung von Plänen. Daher unternimmt der Beitrag 
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1  Introduction: Getting, 
hysterically, off the ox-cart
At one time, practice was considered an application 
of theory, a consequence; at other times, it had an 
opposite sense and it was thought to inspire theory, to 
be indispensable for the creation of future theoretical 
forms. In any event, their relationship was understood 
in terms of a process of totalization [...] however [...] 
The relationships between theory and practice are far 
more partial and fragmentary. On one side, a theory 
is always local and related to a limited field, and it is 
applied in another sphere, more or less distant from 
it. The relationship which holds in the application of a 
theory is never one of resemblance. Moreover, from 
the moment a theory moves into its proper domain, it 
begins to encounter obstacles, walls, and blockages 
which require its relay by another type of discourse (it 
is through this other discourse that it eventually passes 
to a different domain). Practice is a set of relays from 
one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay 
from one practice to another. No theory can develop 
without eventually encountering a wall, and practice is 
necessary for piercing this wall (Deleuze 1977: 205 f.).
Theory and practice are relational, depending for 
their continued viability on mutual referral. Theory, then, 
does not flow above everyday life in a detached way: It 
comes from some place, and it is the responsibility of 
analysis to return it there (Liggett/Perry 1995: 2).
In an editorial, Forester (2015) sparks debate 
around the question of the kind of research that might 
help planners become better. There is, according to 
the author, no definitive answer to that – something 
I personally cannot help but endorse. Yet, rather than 
understanding Forester’s provoking question as a mere 
aporia, in this article I take on his call by stressing the 
role of research and its function as a mediacy within the 
never-ending theory-practice interaction. However, my 
aim is not necessarily to state the type of research that 
would ultimately enable planners to be(come) better (the 
assessment of ‘better’ is, in my view, far too problematic 
and requires a discussion of its own1). Hence, the core 
question that I deal with in this article is how planning 
research ought to be (re)assessed to enable planning 
theory and practice to find a synergic balance. Incipient 
claims are: (i) that such equilibrium, given the innate 
tension between theory and practice, might as well be 
imperfect; and, more specifically, (ii) that a ‘hysterical’, 
as understood in Lacanian theory, change in the way 
planning research is carried out is necessary, in order 
to allow planning practice to be (more) ‘pragmatic’ 
while ‘moving among theoretical points’. The attempt 
to tackle these two theses is, too, partly encouraged by 
my personal practical experience in planning, which was 
largely empirical and fuelled by what I came to determine 
as a universal(ising)/technocratic(ised) planning theory. 
Practice, in this sense, was deemed, as Gilles Deleuze 
observes in the quotation above, as a natural ‘offspring’ 
of theory, though there was an increasing divergence 
between what was theoretically supposed to happen 
1  Affirming ‘better’, for starters, implies that planners are already 
‘good’ at what they do; and that’s when things get tricky. For instance, 
if a planner fulfils their ‘official’ tasks, it is very likely that, in the view 
of their superiors, a ‘good’ job is being done. This, of course, does 
not de facto make a planner indisputably ‘good’. On the other hand, 
say a planner decides to bend the rules of formal planning to make 
it more enthralling and enhance citizen participation. People getting 
involved in the planning process will likely regard the planner as 
‘good’ (as long as they’re not paying lip service), whereas other 
stakeholders may not be as content. For either case, moreover, 
there would arguably be a particular type of research (let alone of 
practice and of theory) that could make planners ‘better’ – though, 
again, that’s something inevitably permeated with subjectivity. 
And to make the issue even more convoluted, let’s consider that a 
planner may “wish to be perceived as a good planner or academic” 
and to be “perceived as ‘good’ means doing the correct thing, 
having the correct values, and acting accordingly” (Gunder 2011: 
205; see also Gunder 2004). And this line of reasoning can go on 
and on.
den Versuch sich tiefer mit der ‚ambivalenten‘ Rolle des Planers auseinanderzusetzen und, ‚Planungsforschung‘ als 
Schlüsselelement in die Diskussion um die Überbrückung von Planungstheorie und -praxis einzubringen. Weiter 
scheint es so, dass es in der Literatur eine Art omnipräsenter Annahme gibt, dass ‚valide‘ Reflexion über Planung nur 
‚von außen‘ kommen kann. Dies führt zur Aufrechterhaltung der Rolle des akademischen Forschers als jenem Akteur, 
welcher analysiert und entschlüsselt, was der Praktiker tut (oder versucht zu tun). Kritische Eindrücke von jenen, die 
‚da draußen‘, ‚im Job‘, sind, fehlen weitgehend. Sie sollten jedoch nicht nur Anekdoten sein, sondern selbstformulierte 
Kritik, ausgelöst durch ein Gefühl des Unbehagens mit dem, was getan wird – durch die hysterische Frage „Warum bin 
ich ein Planer?“ und „Warum mache ich dies oder das“?
Schlüsselwörter: Planungstheorie, psychoanalytische Theorie, Lacan, Diskurs, Unsicherheit
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and what actually occurred – i.e. practical relays did not 
gravitate towards theoretical points.
In spite of such inconsistency, practicing planning 
‘under the spell’ of a totalising theory – that allegedly 
prevents the encounter of walls or obstacles and 
the irruption of ‘other’ discourses that may displace 
it – continues to be pursued. Making sense of such 
conundrums is indeed a bit of a hassle, though 
very pertinent if alternative paths, redefining the 
interconnection between planning theory, research 
and practice, are to be explored. This, moreover, must 
be a relentless task, even a sort of indulgence, which 
resembles the defiance of disentangling a Gordian 
knot to fathom out, a second later, that it is made out 
of an infinite number of other knots. Furthermore, such 
an undertaking is anything but simplistic: it must be 
prompted, as I mentioned above, by hysteria; that is, by 
confronting the inner discomfort with what we are (doing 
or being a part of). Eventually, it is possible to realise that 
we were riding the ox-cart all along and that we need 
to get off, as it were, to theorise, research and practice 
planning ‘outside the box’.
Anti-essentialist Lacanian theory, in such an account, 
represents an ‘untying path’ as well as a means to take 
a ‘hysterical jump’. Now, turning to psychoanalysis – 
apparently not akin to planning – to shed light on the 
interrelationship(s) between planning theory, research 
and practice may well be regarded as adventurous 
and gratuitous. There is, notwithstanding, prolific 
literature that makes use of Lacan’s ‘redefinition of 
psychoanalysis’ (see, inter alia, Gunder 2003a; Gunder 
2003b; Hillier 2003; Gunder 2004; Gunder/Hillier 2004; 
Gunder 2005a; Gunder 2005b; Hillier/Gunder 2005) to 
further develop planning theory by insightfully reviewing 
– the still pervasive – modernist planning praxis in its 
diverse contemporary disguises. In addition, the key to 
fruitful argumentation resides on finding middle ground 
somewhere between an austere (dodging contact with 
other modes of thinking) and an overambitious (bringing 
in an unmanageable amount of perspectives) theoretic-
analytical standpoint. As Friedmann (1998: 249), in 
regard to planning theorising, sustains: “theoretical 
austerity is [...] not the way to go. But writing in the 
plenitude of passion, across the entire gamut of modes 
of theory, runs the danger of saying too much too soon”. 
To sum up, if the task of analysis, as Helen Liggett and 
David Perry affirm in their abovementioned quote, is 
to trace practical ways back to the ‘theoretical springs’ 
embedded in real life situations, psychoanalytic inquiry 
is arguably a useful drill to perforate the walls keeping 
planning theory and practice apart and to “reach far 
beyond the familiar scope of ‘explanatory social science’” 
(Forester 2015: 148).
The article begins with an overview of Lacan’s (2007 
[1991]: 11 ff.) “Production of Four Discourses” to then set 
out different linkages between the realms of planning 
theory, research and practice. The premise is that, 
within the structure of each of the Lacanian discourses 
(the master’s, the university’s, the hysteric’s and the 
analyst’s), theory, research or practice operates as the 
‘agent’ exerting one, or various, discourses, which, in 
turn, makes it the driving force establishing the nexuses. 
Every discourse produced is also affected by the splitting 
between the “subject of enunciation” and the “subject 
of enunciated” infusing inconsistency-inauthenticity 
(into the master), consistency-inauthenticity (into the 
academic), inconsistency-authenticity (into the hysteric) 
and consistency-authenticity (into the analyst) (Žižek 
1993). Correspondingly, each discourse gives rise to a 
particular ‘subject-planner’ (the ‘master’, the ‘expert’, the 
‘idealistic’ and the ‘pragmatic’) with a specific ideological 
upshot (‘hidden’ big Other, ‘feigned’ big Other, hysteria 
and subjective destitution).
That being so, within the planning theory-research-
practice triad, the ‘master’ and the ‘expert’ subject-
planner constitute two sides of the same coin to either 
bypass or subjugate research and thereby determine 
practice. Furthermore, a structural ‘concealed’/‘contrived’ 
ideological order (i.e. a big Other) is created, via a 
universal(ising)/technocractic(ised) planning theory and 
articulated by the master’s and university’s discourse, 
to craft a “pseudo-Hegelian immediate coincidence of 
the opposites: action and reaction should coincide, the 
very thing that causes damage should already be the 
medicine” (Žižek 2003) – that is to say, sustaining the 
impression that the same (kind of) planning that fails 
is the only one that can correct it. Nonetheless, the 
‘idealistic’ and the ‘pragmatic’ subject-planner, building 
on the discourse of the hysteric (critical researcher) and 
analyst (micro-practitioner), are thought to compose two 
sides of a ‘counteractive’ coin that triggers the hysteria 
and the subjective destitution of the universal(ising)/
technocratic(ised) theorist (i.e. both the ‘master’ and the 
‘expert’ subject-planner). As a result, action and reaction 
are, first, separated and, then, kept apart, through the 
synergic differential-symbolic conjunction of planning 
critical-hysterical research and analytical (micro-)
practice.
The article’s ‘not-a-conclusion’ (I believe that there 
should not be an end of the line for this discussion) is 
an open invitation to reconsider, in its utmost manner, 
planning research to, then, call into question how 
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planning theory, all too often, subdues research and 
practice as well as how fruitful critical theoretical 
debates sometimes cannot found practical relays – 
either because they end up being a duel between fierce 
theorists attempting to impose their (new) paradigms, or 
due to their incapability of properly grasping unnameable 
(i.e. beyond what-is-yet-theoretically-known) practical 
instances.2 As aforementioned, critical-hysterical 
planning research is pivotal to co-constitute planning 
theory, research and practice, in such a way that 
universal(ising)/technocratic(ised) theories be consigned 
to oblivion and critical-hysterical research together with 
analytical (micro-)practice aid planners to envisage the 
future and remember the past more pragmatically and 
dynamically. In other words, cutting off the attempt to 
force reality to adapt to megalomaniac visions of the 
future and, in so doing, reduce the use of ‘catchy’ labels 
to render meaningful practical situations that supersede 
theoretical discourse.
2  Socially bonding through 
language: Lacan’s Production of 
Four Discourses
There’s no such thing as a metalanguage (Lacan 1999 
[1975]: 118).
While Lacanian psychoanalysis is not a totalised 
or totalising view of the world, it embodies, as Fink 
(1997: 129) notes, “a very powerful theory and socially 
significant practice”. In addition, continues Fink (1997: 
129), Lacanian theory is a discourse, not the ultimate 
one, nor “in and of itself, a discourse of power” though it 
“deploys a certain kind of power in the analytic situation”. 
Lacan purposely uses the term ‘discourse’, rather 
than ‘speech’, to denote the “transindividual nature of 
language, the fact that speech always implies another 
subject, an interlocutor” (Evans 2006: 45). Discourse, 
therefore, “as a necessary structure that goes well 
beyond speech”, “can clearly subsist without words. It 
2  Gunder and Hillier (2007), building on Derrida’s “aporia of 
undecidability”, offer an alternative take on how to grasp such 
‘unnameable’ planning practices. The authors sustain, by and large, 
that knowledge production, action and responsibility, amid other 
dimensions of the world (including, of course, planning practice) 
must be dealt with while taking into account an inherent lack of 
certainty. Gunder (2008: 196), furthermore, sees undecidability as 
a dimension of the Lacanian Real (see note 5), for “there is never 
complete or perfect knowledge; something is always lacking”.
subsists in certain fundamental relations which would 
literally not be able to be maintained without language” 
(Lacan 2007 [1991]: 12 f.).3 Given that Lacan surpasses 
the content of a discourse and focuses, instead, on 
“the formal relationships that each discourse draws 
through the act of speaking”, his discourse theory “is 
to be understood primarily as a formal system, i.e., 
independent of any spoken word as such” (Verhaeghe 
2001: 21; italics in the original). Discourses, hence, can 
be seen as a sort of encasement that determines the 
limits of thought, communication, and action.
Lacan, in time, revisited his definition of discourse 
(as he did with other of his key formulations like “the 
Real”, “the Other”, “object petit a”). Still emphasising 
intersubjectivity, he came to designate discourse as “a 
social link, founded in language” (Lacan 1999 [1975]: 17), 
which not only precedes the concrete enunciated word, 
but also establishes the framework of the communication 
act. “This effect of determination”, what is more, 
underscores “the Lacanian basic assumption, namely 
that each discourse delineates fundamental relationships, 
resulting in a particular social bond” (Verhaeghe 2001: 
21; italics in the original). That being so, there are four 
possibilities to ‘socially bond’; to provide the symbolic 
network that controls intersubjective interactions 
with an enunciation: the discourse of the master, the 
discourse of the university, the discourse of the hysteric 
and the discourse of the analyst (Lacan 2007 [1991]: 11 
ff.).4 Moreover, “Lacan’s account of four fundamental 
3  By way of clarification, it is noteworthy that the term ‘language’ 
in English corresponds to two different terms in French: langue 
und langage. For Lacan the former designates specific languages 
(e.g., French, English), whereas the latter refers to the system of 
language in general irrespective of any particular language. Since 
what interests Lacan is the general structure of language (langage), 
and not the differences between specific languages (langues), it 
is langage what is almost all of the time meant by language when 
consulting an English translation (Evans 2006: 99).
4  Lacan, as was usually the case, continuously developed his theory 
of four discourses from Seminar XVII, where they were introduced, 
all the way to Seminar XX and beyond (a period during which he 
revised them to a certain extent). While the theory’s inception is 
often associated with the Paris revolts that unfolded in May of 1968, 
it is Lacan’s critical assessment of what he believed were extreme 
orthodox – and thus deficient – readings of the Oedipus complex 
that can be assessed as the outset of the production of the four 
discourses. For more in-depth discussions, see Evans (2006: 45 
ff.), Verhaeghe (2001: 25 ff.), Fink (1997: 129 ff.), Žižek (2006b) and, 
particularly, Bracher (1993: 53 ff.) and Bracher (1994). The authors 
cited here engage in their own particular way when describing 
the four discourses; due to space limitations, I provide a succinct 
description of each discourse building, somewhat tangentially, 
upon them.
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structures of discourse”, according to Bracher (1993: 53), 
is a means of not only discerning the various complex 
ways in which discourses psychologically affect large 
groups of people, but also of bringing about substantial 
outcomes at the social level, for the Lacanian discourses 
“produce, respectively, four fundamental social effects: 
(1) governing/commanding, (2) educating/indoctrinating, 
(3) desiring/protesting, (4) analyzing/transforming/
revolutionizing”.5
The four discourses, employed by Lacan as 
“structural positions” to break down the complexity of 
communication and social relations (Newman 2011: 
349), are represented by an algorithm composed of 
four positions or roles that are taken up by four specific 
psychological factors: knowledge, ideals, self-division 
and jouissance6 (enjoyment) (Bracher 1993: 53). Both 
the type of discourse and its concomitant social effect 
are determined by a particular role, within the algorithm, 
that each of these aforementioned core elements adopts 
– that of the agent (see Figure 1). Consequently, at every 
anticlockwise quarter of a turn, or revolution, referenced 
from the position of the agent, a discourse and its social 
effect come into being. Expressed by algebraic symbols, 
the four fundamental psychological factors, “involved in 
the production and reception of any text or discourse”, 
5  While the upper positions are associated with the manifest and 
evident factors of the discourse’s structure (i.e. the enunciated), 
repressed factors occupy the lower sections (i.e. the enunciation).
6  Even though enjoyment is a somewhat apt translation of 
jouissance, the term has, according to Lacan, very little to do with 
the notion of pleasure in itself (nor with ‘typical’ pleasant situations). 
Jouissance designates an ambivalent condition, whereby the 
subject comes to experience both allurement and refusal of “a 
pleasure that is excessive, leading to a sense of being overwhelmed 
or disgusted, yet simultaneously providing a source of fascination” 
(Fink 1997: xii). As such, (the desire for) jouissance is “indifferent 
– and often inimical – to the well-being both of oneself and of the 
other person” (Bracher 1993: 20). Jouissance, to put it briefly, is this 
underlying drive that makes us pursue certain actions and aims, 
in spite of being aware that doing so might not be best. Gunder 
(2003a) provides a detailed explanation about the role jouissance 
may well play in knowledge production to animate other forms of 
planning theory, practice and, though a bit tangentially, research.
are: “master signifiers (S1), the network of signifiers or 
system of knowledge (S2), the Real
7 that is simultaneously 
excluded and produced by the system of knowledge and 
its master signifiers (a), and the divided subject ($), split 
between the identity to which it is interpellated (S1) and 
the plus-de-jouir (a), the jouissance that it sacrifices in 
assuming that identity” (Bracher 1993: 53).
As shown in Figure 1, Lacan named specifically 
every seat of the algorithmic discursive structure. 
Along the vertical axis of its quadrantal configuration, 
the ‘active’ factors – i.e. those of the subject that utters 
and sends messages – can be seen on the left-hand 
side. In the opposite section are the positions of factors 
prompted by the active factors; that is, those of the 
subject that receives the message. Along the vertical 
axis, the upper positions make up the domain of the 
‘subject of enunciated’, where the messages, embedded 
in any given of the four discourses, are rendered 
comprehensible enough to reach an interlocutor – 
though without ever, as Lacan (2006 [1966]: 677) states, 
signifying the subject. Whereas the “top position on each 
side represents the overt or manifest factor”, the lower 
seats constitute the realm of the “subject of enunciation”, 
7  The Real is one of Lacan’s most enigmatic contrivances. 
The Real, together with the Imaginary and the Symbolic, are the 
three registers of subjectivity through which, by means of master 
signifiers, we are interpellated. Whereas the Symbolic order 
alludes to the subjective dimension that is equated with language, 
“the Imaginary and Real refer, respectively, to […] preverbal and 
postverbal aspects of the subject. The Imaginary is constituted by 
schemata of memory and cognition […] while the Real […] by those 
aspects of the subject’s being that have been excluded from the 
categories of language” (Bracher 1993: 22 f.). The Real, thus, “is a 
lack, or non-place, that language can never fill, but only approach 
through metaphor and metonym” (Gunder 2003a: 296). Moreover, 
the Real, as observed by Žižek (1989: 191; italics in the original) 
is defined by a set of “immediate coincidence of opposite or even 
contradictory determinations”; the Real, then, can be “the starting 
point, the basis, the foundation of the process of symbolization […] 
which in a sense precedes the symbolic order and is subsequently 
structured by it when it gets caught in its network” – yet, the Real 
is “at the same time the product, remainder, scraps of this process 
of symbolization”; it is, in other words, “the excess which escapes 
symbolization and is as such produced by the symbolization itself”.
Figure 1: Positions/roles of the Lacanian discourse according to active (sending the message) and activated subject (receiving the 
message)5. Source: own elaboration based on Bracher (1993: 54), Žižek (1993: 94), Evans (2006: 45) and Fink (1997: 131)
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whereby the unconscious arises (even in ways that are 
contradictory to the uttering “I”), for it “represents the 
covert, latent, implicit, or repressed factor – the factor that 
acts or occurs beneath the surface” (Bracher 1993: 54). 
More specifically, this conscious-unconscious dualism in 
the production of the Lacanian discourses takes place 
between the top and bottom left positions: agent and 
truth, given that the agency is underwritten and given 
rise by the (hidden) truth, which is simultaneously and 
helplessly suppressed by it. Finally, the social links 
(i.e. the vectors connecting the roles) make the four 
fundamental psychological factors behave as dependent 
variables whose interrelations imprint, simultaneously, a 
distinguishing character on each of the four discourses 
and determine how they relate to one another.8
Four roles, four factors, four rotations – four discourses
The discourse of the master: Due to historical 
reasons, it is the first discourse that is both 
phylogenetically and ontogenetically “a sort of primary 
discourse”, constituting the outset of the other three 
discourses9, embodying “the alienating functioning of 
the signifier to which we are all subject” (Fink 1997: 130). 
It is, moreover, the initial one, since the discourse of 
the master originates the symbolic order (see footnote 
6), “presenting us with a formal expression of [...] the 
constitution of the subject” (Verhaeghe 2001: 26). In the 
master’s discourse the dominant position is occupied by 
the master signifier (S1) that is “to be seen as intervening 
[...] in a signifying battery that we have no right, ever, to 
take as dispersed, as not already forming a network of 
what is called knowledge” (Lacan 2007 [1991]: 13). In the 
master’s discourse the illusion of equating the subject 
8  The social links, oddly enough, are actually somewhat incomplete. 
Although it could be expected, as the vectors suggest in Figure 1, 
that there is a feedback or response from the position of ‘Product/
Loss’ towards that underlying the agency of the message sent (i.e. 
the position of ‘Truth’); “since no receiver is ever completely ‘empty’, 
such coincidence is never more than partial: the interpellative force 
never positions the receiver at the point of demanding from the 
sender a repetition of precisely the original impetus” (Bracher 1993: 
54). Thus, both the top and bottom vector must be, in fact, seen 
as interrupted. Such a condition is, furthermore, triggered by the 
disjunctions of impossibility and inability “expressing the disruption 
of the communicative line” (Verhaeghe 2001: 23 ff.).
9  According to Fink (1997: 131) while Hegel had already identified 
the master’s discourse, the other three discourses emerged (much) 
later. Moreover, only the university’s and the analyst’s discourse 
seem to have proceeded from the master’s discourse, for it was not 
until the analyst’s discourse had arisen, by the end of the nineteenth 
century, that the hysteric’s discourse came into being.
with its own signifying takes place with the express aim 
of excluding “the unconscious – the knowledge that is 
not known – as this would jeopardize the ego’s sense 
of certainty and autonomy” (Newman 2011: 349; italics 
in the original). The matter of concern to the master, in 
this regard, rather than knowledge, is certainty – as long 
as everything functions as desired and power is upheld, 
is not worth bothering with discovering why and/or how 
things work.
The discourse of the university: 10 In the university’s 
discourse, the agency is taken up by “knowledge” (S2) 
and, as a result, “systematic knowledge is the ultimate 
authority, reigning instead of [the master’s] blind will, 
and everything has its reason [...] providing a sort of 
legitimation or rationalization of the master’s will” (Fink 
1997: 132). In the discourse of the university it is brought 
to the fore that any one attempt to produce ‘absolutely’ 
neutral knowledge is, after all, a pursuit of domination 
over the other to whom knowledge is being conveyed 
(Evans 2006: 46). Thus, the university’s discourse 
stands for the hegemony of knowledge, visible in the 
modernist predominance of science, for it is “the use of 
systemic knowledge for rationalization by the agent of 
the speech act” (Gunder 2004: 307). The success of such 
rationalisation relies on the way knowledge is “presented 
as an accumulated, organised and transparent unity, 
coming straightforwardly to us from the textbooks”; 
though for it to work a master signifier (S1) must come 
into play (Verhaeghe 2001: 30). All in all, “working in the 
service of the master signifier, more or less any kind 
of argument will do, as long as it takes on the guise of 
reason and rationality” (Fink 1997: 133) – a principle that 
suggests that (absolute) objectivity is nothing but mere 
trickery (Gunder 2004: 307; Verhaeghe 2001: 31).
The discourse of the hysteric: the discourse uttered 
by the hysteric, as opposed to the discourse of the 
university, “is associated with the practice of protesting, 
and in this sense it is always pitted against the authority 
of the Master” (Newman 2011: 349) and any of its (ir)
rational articulations embodied by the university’s 
discourse. In the hysteric’s discourse, the split subject ($) 
becomes the agent and addresses the master signifier 
(S1), demanding the master to “prove his or her mettle 
by producing something serious by way of knowledge” 
(Fink 1997: 133). In so doing, the hysterical split subject, 
in his or her quest for an answer, must turn the other into 
a master signifier – however, any answer provided “will 
10  As clarification, “one should always bear in mind that, for 
Lacan, university discourse is not directly linked to the university as 
a social institution” (Žižek 2006c).
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always be beside the point”, because the networks of 
signifiers (S2) cannot “produce a particular answer about 
the particular driving force of the object a at the place of 
the truth” (Verhaeghe 2001: 29). Thus, the discourse of 
the hysteric is the complete opposite of the discourse 
of the university. Whereas the “hysteric gets off on 
knowledge”, knowledge in the university’s discourse, 
instead of an end to be attained, functions as a means 
whereby the “academic’s very existence and activity”11 is 
justified (Fink 1997: 133). Lacan, ultimately, coupled the 
discourse of the hysteric with the discourse of science, 
due to the uniqueness of the relationship the hysteric 
establishes with knowledge (Fink 1997: 133). Such 
distinctiveness, furthermore, is characteristic of critical 
(academic) questioning aimed at producing alternative 
new knowledge (Gunder 2004: 307).
The discourse of the analyst: Once the final quarter 
of a turn has taken place, the object petit a (surplus 
enjoyment), as the cause of desire, is the agent 
occupying the commanding position triggering the 
analyst’s discourse. In the frame of psychoanalytical 
treatment, this means that the analyst is, in due course, 
to become the cause of the analysand’s desire. As the 
analyst’s discourse is the actual inverse of the master’s 
discourse, psychoanalysis, in Lacan’s view, “is an 
essentially subversive practice which undermines all 
attempts at domination and mastery” (Evans 2006: 
47). The discourse of the analyst is therefore the sole 
“effective means for countering the psychological and 
social tyranny exercised through language” (Bracher 
1994: 123), given that it “stands for the emergence of 
revolutionary-emancipatory subjectivity that resolves the 
split of university and hysteria” (Žižek 2006c). In order to 
achieve such a goal, the analyst looks into the precise 
points in which the conscious and the unconscious 
split and the analysand “‘coughs up’ a master signifier 
that has not yet been brought into relation with any 
other signifier” (Fink 1997: 135). What the analyst then 
attempts to do is to relate this ‘new’ master signifier with 
other (already existing, or, knowable) signifiers. To that 
end, “a link must be established between each master 
signifier and a binary signifier such that subjectification 
takes place”, for the discourse of the analyst occupies 
itself with unconscious knowledge, “that knowledge that 
is caught up in the signifying chain and has yet to be 
11  In the master’s discourse, knowledge, though it remains 
inaccessible to the master, is cherished to the extent that it produces 
a surplus suitable for the master’s best interest (Fink 1997: 133) – 
which is, in the end, the task of the (manipulated technocratic(ised)) 
academic.
subjectified. Where that knowledge was, the subject 
must come to be” (Fink 1997: 135). Moreover, Lacan 
explains that, whereas the analyst deploys the discourse 
of the analyst, the analysand inevitably resorts to the 
discourse of the hysteric.
Psychoanalytic theory and, particularly, Lacan’s 
theory of four discourses, all things considered, offer 
analytical depth without falling into the contradictory trap 
of becoming a definitive ‘master’s discourse on truth’, 
because psychoanalysis, “without itself constituting 
a ‘metalanguage’”, allows us “to understand the 
functioning of different discourses in a unique way” 
(Fink 1997: 198; italics in the original). The theory of 
four discourses, correspondingly, due to the intrinsic 
and a priori emptiness of each discourse that shapes 
the content (i.e. whatever is intended to be analysed) 
that is deposited into them, can be deployed for almost 
any given analytical purpose. However, it must be 
noted that, while the discourses “can contain almost 
anything”, the moment a discourse is reduced to one 
single interpretation “the whole theory implodes and one 
returns to the science of the particular” (Verhaegue 2001: 
21). I will next discuss how different discourses, mediated 
by a particular ‘subject-planner’ (see Table 1), operate 
within certain – which  does not de facto suggest that 
there cannot be any other – interactions among planning 
theory, research and practice.
3  The rise of the ‘subject-
planner’: Lacan’s four 
discourses within the planning 
theory-research-practice triad
Lacanian thought has been sharply utilised in the field 
of planning12 to discuss aspects such as the way it may 
inform planning education (Gunder 2004), planning 
policy-making (Gunder 2003b, Gunder 2005a), the role 
of norms and ethics in the exercise of planning (Gunder/
Hillier 2004), the interaction between discourse and 
practice (Hillier/Gunder 2005) and the interplay among 
planning, language and ideology (Gunder 2011).13 Since 
12  According to Hillier and Gunder (2003), while there is a 
psychogeographic literature, based on Walter Benjamin and Henri 
Lefebvre, well represented in the works of Pile (1996), Soja (2000) and 
Thrift (2000), Lacan, in planning circles of theoretical reflection, has in 
the last couple of decades or so begun to gain relevance as insightful.
13  A wide array of authors like Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, 
Slavoj Žižek, Yannis Stavrakakis, Jodi Dean, Julia Kristeva, among 
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the conceptual framework of Lacanian theory, as Gunder 
(2003a: 311) observes, helps to further and broaden our 
understanding “of how the world is constituted and how 
we might do planning differently to accommodate our 
needs and desires”, my intention here is to build up a 
series of relationships that are established within the 
planning theory-research-practice triad, when theory, 
research or practice operates as the agent, and adopts 
one or various types of the Lacanian discourse. It is 
important to note that just because one of the discourses 
is called ‘the hysteric’s discourse’ that hysterics are 
not inescapably circumscribed within such discourse. 
Contrariwise, “as an analyst, the hysteric may function 
within the analyst’s discourse; as an academic, the 
hysteric may function within the discourse of the 
university” (Fink 1997: 129 f.). Thus, planning theorists, 
researchers and practitioners, for instance, can move 
from one discourse to another, without ever altering their 
physical structure, but varying nonetheless their efficacy, 
for they “suffer from the obstacles and shortcomings 
endemic” to whatever discourse they choose to deploy, 
because irremediably “a particular discourse facilitates 
certain things and hinders others, allows one to see 
certain things while blinding one to others” (Fink 1997: 
130).
3.1  The inherent dual condition of the 
discourse’s agency
Likewise, Lacan’s distinction between ‘full speech’ 
and ‘empty speech’ is a determining aspect when 
analysing the production of linkages among planning 
theory, research and practice: “as a rule, empty speech 
is conceived as empty; nonauthentic prattle in which 
the speaker’s subjective position of enunciation is 
not disclosed, whereas in full speech, the subject is 
supposed to express his or her authentic existential 
position of enunciation” (Žižek 1993: 94). Hence, the 
connection between empty and full speech is to be seen 
in terms of the dual condition between the “subject of 
the enunciated” and the “subject of the enunciation”. The 
subject of the enunciated (also known as the subject of 
the statement or utterance) is “I”, the first person – the 
psychoanalytical ego. In daily discourse, it is the subject 
to which the agency of speech is attributed, as Van 
many others, who have engaged with Lacan’s psychoanalytical 
theory in the light of academic areas such as feminism, cultural 
studies, political science, ideology, have, likewise, influenced 
efforts to see planning through a psychoanalytical lens.
Haute (2002: 40) explains: “the subject of the statement 
[...] refers to the subject as it appears to itself and to 
the other”. Moreover, the subject of the enunciated, 
according to Lacan (2006 [1966]: 677), despite being a 
signifier, does not signify the subject, for the “I” gives 
context to what is being said (i.e. the ‘enunciation’) 
and renders it understandable; that is to say, it is by 
way of the “I” that it is possible to make sense of what 
has been said. The subject of the enunciation, on the 
other hand, is the subject of the unconscious. It arises 
from within speech by means of signifiers that differ 
from and even contradict the “I” of the enunciated 
statement. According to Lacan (2008 [2005]: 36), rather 
than producing discourse the subject of the enunciation 
is “produced [...], cornered even [...], by discourse” – 
inasmuch as the subject of the enunciation speaks it is 
spoken. It is through the very act of enunciation that the 
psychoanalytical unconscious can be accessed, since 
“the presence of the unconscious, being situated in the 
locus of the Other, can be found in every discourse, in 
its enunciation” (Lacan 2006 [1966]: 707). (In Figure 1 
it can be seen where, within the discursive algorithmic 
structure, each subject is operative.)
Full speech, therefore, is not to be understood as 
simply filling out empty speech, “[q]uite the contrary, [...] 
it is only empty speech by way of its emptiness (of its 
distance toward the enunciated content which is posited 
in it as totally indifferent) which creates the space for ‘full 
speech’” (Žižek 1993: 94). In this regard, if, for instance, 
“systematic knowledge is the dominant element of a 
discourse […], receivers, in order to understand this 
discourse, must (for a moment, at least) be receptive 
to a preconstituted knowledge, which means emptying 
themselves of any knowledge that might interfere with 
the knowledge in the discourse” (Bracher 1993: 54) and 
thus be rearticulated by the dominant discourse – such 
interpellation, it must be remarked, may result in either 
a product or a loss (see Figure 1). Consequently, it is in 
full speech that the subject can articulate their position of 
enunciation – an act that is never even-handed because 
“publicly reporting on something […] affects the reported 
content itself […] it changes everything” (Žižek 2006a: 
18). The rupture between the subject of the enunciated 
and the subject of the enunciation is well identified in 
what Lacan calls the “liar-paradox” that is able to utter “an 
authentic subjective acknowledgement”, by, for example, 
admitting, “‘I am lying!’ I acknowledge the inauthenticity 
of my being, of my subjective position of enunciation, 
and in this sense I am telling the truth” (Žižek 1993: 
246). This contradictory capacity of the subject renders 
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the agency of the Lacanian discourse inconsistent and 
inauthentic (when the master signifier (S1) is exerting the 
discourse); consistent but inauthentic (in the case of the 
academic, i.e. knowledge (S2), occupying the leading 
seat within the algorithmic structure of the discourse); 
inconsistent and yet authentic (this dualism is that of the 
hysterical split subject ($)); and consistent and authentic 
(such a triumphant stance being devoted to the analyst 
(a)) (Žižek 1993: 274).
Lacan’s distinction of the subject of the enunciated 
from the subject of the enunciation affirms the inescapable 
split, castrated, divided character of the subject, as well 
as underscoring the fact that the subject is, after all, a 
speaking being.14 Put another way, the subject comes into 
existence through language, because the subject is “that 
which is represented by a signifier for another signifier, in 
other words, the subject is an effect of language” (Evans 
2006: 198). By the same token, it is the subject, in its 
inherent dual condition of enunciated-enunciation, that 
gives way to language (and, by extension, to discourse) 
in an effort, unavoidably doomed to fail, to clasp an 
object that supersedes language itself – language and 
subject are therefore interdependent.15
3.2  From delusional mastery to 
pragmatic destitution: The subject-
planners and their ideological tasks
Bearing all this in mind, l now turn to explore specific 
relationships among planning theory, research and 
practice, according to the element of the triad acting 
as the agent and the discourse(s) employed. Given 
the aforementioned dialectical relationship between 
language and subject, each type of discourse produces 
a distinct sort of ‘subject-planner’; after all, “planners 
act in and through language” (Gunder 2011: 201). 
Correspondingly, every subject-planner has a specific 
ideological role that ultimately sustains the diverse 
14  “The result of language acquisition is a loss of a primary condition 
called ‘nature’. From the moment you speak, you become a subject 
of language (a divided subject for that matter), who tries to grasp an 
object beyond language, or, more accurately, a condition beyond the 
separation between subject and object” (Verhaeghe 2001: 25).
15  From an even broader perspective, Gunder (2011: 201), following 
Lacan (2006 [1966]) and MacCannell (2009: 823), observes that 
it would not be possible to conceive a society without language 
inasmuch as a language without society. And, in spite of this vital 
co-dependency, “language, in itself, cannot fully constitute identity 
for the subject or comprehensively describe reality” (Gunder 2011: 
201). These aspects, furthermore, that escape linguistic articulation, 
are piled up in the registry of the Real (see footnote 6).
ways in which planning theory, research and practice, 
as depicted in Figure 2, interact and, in turn, renders 
each of the subject-planners meaningful (see Table 1). 
16 The fact, moreover, that the ideological task shifts, is 
because ideology “is never just meaning, it always has 
to also work as an empty container open to all possible 
meanings” (Žižek 2012). Planning, in a like manner, “is 
inherently ideological, because ideology constitutes our 
chosen and dominant belief, or value, systems” (Gunder 
2010: 299) which are, consequently, reflected in the 
discourse deployed to theorise, research or practice 
planning.17
3.2.1  Universal(ising) planning theory discourse 
as the voice of planning’s veiled big Other, or, the 
production of solipsistic knowledge
As shown in Figure 2, the first case is that of 
universal(ising) planning theory functioning as the master 
signifier (S1); that is to say, occupying the commanding 
position and making use of the master’s discourse. As a 
result, the ‘master’ subject-planner emerges and, due to 
their disregard for the production of knowledge (as long 
as it serves their purpose), bypasses research to directly 
encapsulate the exercise of planning in a standardising 
manner. Think, for example, of the principles emanated 
from the Congrès International d’Achitecture Moderne 
(CIAM) putting forward the idea that social problems 
could be, first, reverted and, in the long run, prevented 
by impinging a ‘perfect’ geometrical form upon societies. 
This straightforward passage from theory to practice 
clearly states that no substantial epistemological base 
is, allegedly, needed in order to assert what has to be 
done and how it has to be done – without, of course, 
ever having to say why. Discourses of universal(ising) 
planning theories (e.g., comprehensive and synoptic 
planning) smack inevitably of contradiction: there is 
enough evidence to show that socio-spatial reality could 
never be tamed. Yet they seem honest in their endeavours 
to propel forward a well-ordered space for people to live 
pleasantly in, cherish nature (e.g., the Garden City), 
practice truly participatory democracy, and so on. The 
catch, though, is that concepts “of complete information, 
16  This process, for the first two cases, as it will be shown, is 
largely imbued by what Gunder (2011: 205 ff.) calls “the habitation 
of ‘good’ planners”.
17  For a more detailed account on ideology in planning theory 
(and its implications for planning practice), which exceeds the 
length of this article, see Gunder (2011: 203 ff.) and, particularly, 
Gunder (2010: 300 ff.).
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a harmonious society and of consensus are the Lacanian 
impossible Real of utopian dreams rather than actual 
lived reality” (Hillier 2003: 45). Universal(ising) planning 
theories therefore acquire a tinge of inauthenticity in 
their tragic fruitless efforts to symbolise and materialise 
the Real, for all they end up doing is misleading it by 
producing solipsistic knowledge.
During an interview, Brazilian architect Oscar 
Niemeyer, who with the urban planner Lúcio Costa 
conceived Brasilia, Brazil’s new capital, avowed that 
social problems affecting the city, rather than being 
associated with its layout, resulted directly from the 
suffusing logic of capitalism and the government’s 
incapacity to cope with social problems that arose 
therefrom: “[building Brasilia] was a liberating time. 
It seemed as if a new society was being born, with all 
the traditional barriers cast aside. It didn’t work. Now, 
Brasilia is too big. The developers, the capitalists are 
there, dividing society and spoiling the city. Brasilia 
should stop” (quoted in Glancey 2007). This kind of 
mastery discourse, while remaining faithful to its original 
intentions (generating ‘a totally free society’ – a sort of 
oxymoronic consistency with his prior inconsistency), 
fails to realise that those intentions, though authentic, are 
per se unachievable and that consequences are indeed 
unimaginable. ‘Master’ subject-planners, by deploying 
the discourse of the master to support their actions, are 
inevitably “caught in a bind between what they want to 
believe and what they know is true, between espoused 
theory and actual practice. This often leads to much 
confusion, most importantly to the idea that planning 
is purely a technical activity and politics is something 
that takes place downstream from the technical work 
and can only mock it up” (Throgmorton 2003: 128). 
For the purpose of circumventing this complication, 
universal(ising) planning theory resorts to a hidden 
structural order that provides the ‘master’ subject-
planner with enough apparent consistency: the big 
Other18, “this basic element of every ideological edifice 
[…] the secret order of things; like divine reason, faith 
or whatever that is controlling our destiny” (Žižek 2012). 
To put it briefly, the inconsistent universal(ising) theorist 
18  “The big Other designates radical alterity, an other-ness which 
transcends the illusory otherness of the imaginary because it 
cannot be assimilated through identification. Lacan equates this 
radical alterity with language and the law, and hence the big Other 
is inscribed in the order of the symbolic. Indeed, the big Other is the 
symbolic insofar as it is particularised for each subject. The Other 
is thus both another subject, in his radical alterity and unassimilable 
uniqueness, and also the symbolic order which mediates the 
relationship with that other subject” (Evans 2006: 136).
creates an undisclosed structural order that functions as 
practice’s inauthentic underpinning, thereby rendering 
research useless to practice (this discursive planning 
logic is easily identifiable in ‘contemporary’ rhetorical 
formulations such as the ‘smart’ or ‘creative’ city).
3.2.2  The embodiment of planning’s counterfeit 
Big Other: Planning as value-free and uncritical 
rationality
The second case, closely related to the first one, proposes 
that the agency is performed by a technocratic(ised) 
planning theory, in the form of knowledge (S2) and adopting 
the discourse of the university. In such an account, the 
‘expert’ subject-planner comes to the fore to control, at 
their pleasure, research and, in so doing, inculcate any 
given justification the universal(ising) theorist (i.e. the 
‘master’ subject-planner) might be in need of. Research 
thus resorts to the discourses of both the master and the 
university to comply with the technocratic(ised) theory’s 
mandate: to determine practice, which, in turn, is to 
determine reality. In short, technocratic(ised) theory is 
to back up power in its quest to define what reality is 
“rather than discovering what reality ‘really’ is” (Flyvbjerg 
2003: 319). To that end, research may well deploy the 
discourse of the master and, following the logic of the first 
case described above, control practice; or, if necessary, 
research creates the systemic knowledge that justifies 
the technocratic(ised) theory’s will. In the former 
scenario, power, bestowed, wielded and articulated 
by ‘servant’ planning researchers (i.e. ‘expert’ subject-
planners), “defines, and creates, concrete physical, 
economic, ecological and social realities” (Flyvbjerg 
2003: 320), while in the latter scenario, research helps to 
turn rationality into rationalisation to then get away with 
it.
Procedural planning, with its compulsive obsession 
with the means, rather than the ends, of planning, is 
an example of how ‘technocratic’ academics utter a 
technocratic-master’s discourse or a technocratic-
university’s discourse (or even a combination of both) to 
impose a definitive (mode of) planning praxis. Here the 
difference between the ‘technocratic’ and the ‘intellectual’ 
planning academic is encountered: whereas the former 
will insist relentlessly on solving planning’s ‘wicked 
problems’ by means of a perfectly conceived planning 
procedure (or method), founded on an “habituated 
ideology” that helps to fake it till it is possible “to make it as 
an expert that truly knows” (Gunder 2011: 207/205; italics 
in the original); the latter, through critical-philosophical 
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examination of the wicked problems and “‘experientially 
based intuition’” (Gunder 2011: 205), shows that the 
very way problems are perceived hinders their solutions 
(or leastways mitigations) (Žižek 2006b: 137). That is 
why the technocratic(ised) planning academic “rather 
than getting off on knowledge, would seem to get off 
on alienation” (Fink 1997: 198). Similarly, Merrifield 
(2015: 754; italics in the original), drawing on Said’s 
(1993: 8) distinction between amateur and professional 
intellectuals, their relation to power and authority, and 
their role in knowledge production, highlights that “one 
speaks truth to power while the other speaks the truth 
of power”. Not surprisingly, the technocratic planning 
academic, in order to speak the truth of power, recourses 
to the discourse of the master, whereas the intellectual 
planning academic is likely to deploy the discourse of the 
hysteric to, rebelliously, speak the truth to power.
Planning research, within this interaction, despite 
being consistent (‘planning recipes’ are, in themselves, 
coherent discourses), is helplessly inauthentic for 
it is at the service of the obfuscating interests of 
technocratic(ised) planning theory (which, in the end, 
operates, in this second interaction, as universal(ising) 
planning theory’s shell). As a result, planning is practiced 
as post hoc fallacy set to, via a ‘magical’ method, bring 
disarray into order – however, all the while overlooking 
the fact that envisioned planning schemes, based upon 
a symbolic network made of unconscious fantasies and 
illusions meant to structure social and spatial reality 
anew (Žižek 1989: 33), have absolutely nothing to do 
with the actual condition of the existing socio-spatial 
reality. In order to obviate such divergence, the ‘expert’ 
subject-planner must generate a ‘feigned’ big Other 
(i.e. a structural order of appearances that makes up 
practice’s inauthentic spearhead) and thus provide the 
impression that the task of relating processes of decision 
to the social conditions in which they must operate could 
be smoothly carried out, rather than be hampered, 
because rational planning is supposed to stand as 
universal truth (i.e. to speak the truth of power) and not 
be subject to alteration through experience (Wildavsky 
1973: 152). Such demeanour, more specifically, is 
nothing but gratuitous: it keeps the ‘expert’ (as well as 
the ‘master’) subject-planner from identifying with their 
planning “symbolic mask-title”, by engendering what 
Lacan calls “symbolic castration”; that is, “the gap 
between what I immediately am and the symbolic title 
that confers on me a certain status and authority” and “in 
this precise sense, far from being the opposite of power, 
it is synonymous with power; it is what gives power” 
(Žižek 2006a: 34). To sum up, the ‘expert’ subject-
planner, embodying and embodied by, the master’s and 
the university’s discourse, is able to manipulate research 
and control practice accordingly, because of their ability 
not only to not question their symbolic character, but also 
to cynically speak the truth of power. Yet, this word of 
“rational scientific management” (Gunder 2010: 301) has 
an Achilles heel: it can be torn asunder by triggering the 
universal(ising)/technocratic(ised) theorist’s hysteria – 
the questioning of their symbolic label.
3.2.3  The ‘Brownian motion’ of critical planning 
research, or, the hysterical unveiling of 
universal(ising)/technocratic(ised) planning’s big 
Other
In the third case displayed in Figure 2, critical research is 
the hysterical split subject ($) and hence the agent uttering 
the discourse of the hysteric that confronts and defies, by 
frontally speaking truth to power, both universal(ising) and 
technocratic(ised) theory. As a result, critical-hysterical 
planning research attempts incessantly – though helplessly 
flubbing – to reshape practice, by recognising that it is a 
matter of neither systematisation nor dogmatism, rather 
of uncertain shambles and unorthodoxy.19 There is a large 
body of planning literature that may well be seen as critical-
hysterical research, in which the hysteric’s discourse is 
the “discourse of both the questioning academic and the 
questioning planning student seeking the production and 
assurance of new knowledge (S2)” (Gunder 2004: 307). 
There is, however, a snag: answers, if any are found, 
never coincide with the ones sought in the first place, 
because hysterical knowledge, as explained earlier, “is 
unable to produce a particular answer about the particular 
driving force of the object a at the place of truth” that is the 
actual drive of the hysterical agent whose inevitable failure 
“results in a never-ending battle between the hysterical 
subject and the master on duty, especially if the latter 
wants to keep his master-position” (Verhaeghe 2001: 29; 
italics in the original).20
19  Boelens and de Roo (2016) advocate for planning to be 
reconsidered, for both theoretical and practical (though not, at 
least advertently, mentioning research) purposes, as “undefined 
becoming”. Similarly, Hillier (2008: 24) proposes, building on Gilles 
Deleuze’s ‘planar philosophy’, a “multiplanar theory of spatial 
planning” that stresses the need of embracing, through “a multiple, 
relational approach of dynamic complexities”, the “contingencies of 
place, time and actant behaviours”.
20  Recall here, as an example, Flyvbjerg’s (2002: 354) anecdote 
about the report he prepared, as “a planner-to-be”, to summarise 
arguments to promote either centralisation or decentralisation of 
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Thus, the critical-hysterical planning researcher, 
while being authentic (their demands to the master and 
the technocractic academic are completely legitimate), is 
doomed to be inconsistent because of their incapacity to 
pair questions/problems and answers/solutions together. 
Nonetheless, there is more than meets the eye in such 
inability since it is precisely the fundamental conceited 
desire of both universal(ising) and technocratic(ised) 
planning theory to find definitive solutions to the 
problematic situations planners, in practice, have to deal 
with; the critical-hysterical planning researcher, without 
being fully aware of it, evades this deception. By way 
of this elusion, critical-hysterical planning researchers 
are, paradoxically, short-circuiting the way to a critical-
hysterical planning practice – they know something is 
wrong, denounce it, but fall short of asserting a remedy. 
This dogged effort, moreover, is what renders them 
‘idealistic’ subject-planners in ‘Brownian motion’ from 
theoretical points to practical relays (and vice versa); i.e. 
with no certainties, with no full knowledge, in constant 
fluctuation, permanently seeking discovery – and that’s 
how modernist planning’s masterly-expert perversion 
can actually be outdone.
Given that, as explained by Verhaeghe (2001: 29), 
“structurally, the hysterical discourse results in alienation 
for the hysterical subject [i.e. ‘idealistic’ subject-planner] 
and in [symbolic] castration for the master” subject-
planner, the ideological task of the critical-hysterical 
planning researcher is the hystericisation – the self-
division – of the universal(ising)/technocratic(ised) 
planning theorist. “Hysteria emerges when a subject 
starts to question or to feel discomfort in his or her 
symbolic identity” (Žižek 2006a: 35); that is, when the 
critical-hysterical researcher, speaking truth to power, 
makes the ‘master’ and ‘expert’ subject-planner ask 
themselves: ‘why am I a planner?’ Such a question, 
furthermore, transversally touches a historical and, 
foremost, an ideological context upon which the symbolic 
identity is built, because symbolic identities (including, 
of course, that of planners) are determined by the 
‘interpellation’ that (any given ruling) ideology, through 
a political and social institutional framework, enforces. 
social, educational and health services in Denmark. His proposal, 
aimed at decentralisation and derived from a British study, to 
diminish the duration of children’s journeys to schools was blatantly 
disregarded with no significant argument but a handwritten note 
stating “Cancel, may not apply in Denmark”. Evidencing a master-
servant relationship (Faludi 1973: 2), Flyvbjerg (2002: 354) came to 
conclude that centralisation had already been chosen as the way 
to go and “that the Regional Planning Authority was not to interfere 
with knowledge that might question the wisdom of the decision”.
In sum, “all ideology hails or interpellates concrete 
individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of 
the category of the subject” (Althusser 2001 [1971]: 117; 
italics in the original).
The response of the ‘master’ and ‘expert’ subject-
planner to their incapacity to provide a true answer as 
to what it is that makes them planners (and planning21 
to what they do) – the response that goes well beyond 
words and is thus the concern of the object petit a – is 
the production of more signifiers that eventually end up 
in “the confrontation between the master on the one 
hand and the fundamental lack in the signifying chain 
on the other” (Verhaeghe 2001: 29). Such a clash is 
what eventually opens up the possibility to overcome 
the universalisation and technocratisation of planning 
theory, research and practice, for it enables the planner’s 
‘subjective destitution’ through which a ‘deeper’ meaning 
is neither sought nor imposed.
3.2.4  The ‘master’ and ‘expert’ subject-planner’s 
subjective destitution: De-hystericising the 
‘universal/technocratic’ big Other
The final interaction is triggered when (micro-)practice22 
performs as the agency of the discourse of the analyst; 
i.e. practice as surplus enjoyment (a). Just like the critical-
hysterical planning researcher, the analytical planning 
micro-practitioner calls into question universal(ising) 
and technocratic(ised) planning theory, but in a much 
more profound way, for “the analyst’s discourse stands 
for the emergence of revolutionary-emancipatory 
subjectivity that resolves the split between university 
and hysteria” whose “goal is to isolate, get rid of, the 
master signifier that structured the subject’s (ideologico-
political) unconscious” (Žižek 2006c). Analytical 
planning (micro-)practice, in consequence, not only 
unveils the manipulated technocratic academic, but also 
confronts the critical-hysterical researcher, who exerts 
a reciprocal counteracting influence on the analytical 
(micro-)practitioner. It is hard to put one’s finger on what 
tells one from the other, given that, at times, they could 
perfectly be the same; however, not simultaneously. 
21  See Alexander (2016) for a compelling and thorough discussion 
on the seemingly simple question “what is planning?” While reading 
it, it is worthwhile asking oneself which discourse is being employed 
and the extent to which more signifiers are being produced (or not).
22  The prefix “micro-” is here employed to underscore opposition 
to the totalising (i.e. macro) character of universal(ising) and 
technocracti(sed) planning theory, rather than to denote a spatial-
geographical scale.
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Therefore, the relationship between the analytical 
planning (micro-)practitioner and the critical-hysterical 
planning researcher resembles, in some way, that 
between the analyst (analytical (micro-)practice) and the 
analysand (critical-hysterical research), in which, “while 
the analyst adopts the analyst discourse, the analysand 
is inevitably, in the course of analysis, hystericized” 
(Fink 1997: 136). Intellectual planning academics who, at 
some point, have taken to the streets and, then, further 
elaborated their experience – somehow disrespecting 
the formalities of ethnographic research – in academia 
are arguably analyst (micro-)practitioners turned into 
critical-hysterical researchers (and, eventually, back to 
analyst (micro-)practitioners, and so on and so forth). 
Moreover, this wavering from analytical (micro-)practice 
to critical-hysterical research shows that assuming that 
there is “little to learn from astute practitioners who have 
no-one to document, illuminate, and appreciate their 
work” (Forester 2015: 147) cannot be any more bogus. 
On the contrary, its value relies on how it undermines the 
dictum of a planning practice suffused with the anxieties 
of universal(ising)/technocratic(ised) planning theories 
that disregard any form of subversive counter-practice.23
Furthermore, according to Gunder (2004: 308), 
planning practitioners are not able to appropriately 
grasp “the underlying ideological distortions and norms 
comprising the planning field” for they are not fully aware 
of them. Moreover, continues Gunder, an external and 
critical point of view is required to reveal the ideological 
illusions that planning practices engender and that 
practitioners are embedded in – which is, precisely, the 
ultimate task of the critical-hysterical planning researcher. 
Be that as it may, it is also feasible that planning 
practitioners ‘wake up’ and confront the internal and 
dormant contradictions of their profession (as seldom as 
this might be); that is to say, insightful analysis can also 
come from within, from ‘dissident’ planning practitioners 
willing to alter the ‘planning status quo’. Such ‘rebellion 
from within’ would, too, entail what Lacan calls “subjective 
destitution”, “the de-hystericization by means of which 
the subject loses its status as subject” (Žižek 1996: 42) 
through “stepping out totally of the domain of symbolic 
identification; cancelling or suspending the entire filth of 
symbolic authority, the entire filth of the big Other” (Žižek 
23  Imagine a ‘GIS-ace’ land use planner having to come to terms 
with a land use scheme put together by people from an informal 
settlement vis-à-vis an official, technical – if not, ‘technocraticised’ 
and ‘universal(ising)’ – one. The ontological and epistemological 
disparity between one proposal and the other would most likely 
make it impossible for the technocratic(ised) land use planner to 
recognise as valid the ‘informal one’.
2012). Put another way, the subject-planner (particularly, 
the ‘master’ and ‘expert’) becomes the “‘cause of itself’ in 
the sense of no longer looking for a guarantee of his or 
her existence in another’s desire” (Žižek 2012). Together 
with this comes the realisation that being a planner in 
its most universal-technocratic sense (as in actually 
believing oneself to be the only ‘holy’ one allowed to 
‘plan’) must be replaced by a permanent quest for ways 
through which, by deploying the discourse of the analyst, 
to expose “repressed fragments required for displacing 
dysfunctional societal constructs so that less repressive 
constructs might then develop, in their place” (Gunder 
2003a: 303).
Because of this, planning (micro-)practice is 
able to rearrange the alleged ‘fixity’ of the planning 
theory-research-practice triad – a fixity that, not 
surprisingly, is safeguarded by either universal(ising) or 
technocratic(ised) planning theory. Analytical (micro-)
practice, as well as critical-hysterical research, in this 
way, follow a principle of discovery that, instead of seeking 
to state universal delusional canons, grounds theory in 
(socio-spatial) reality and recognises the practice of 
planning as fickle, open to errors, which, in turn, renders 
the subject-planner as fallible and thus pragmatic – 
i.e. the planner understands that planning in the ‘real 
world’ is no picnic and not a simple matter of ‘doing 
everything by the book’.24 Overall, the authentic planning 
micro-practitioner, through the de-hystericisation of 
the universal(ising) and technocratic(ised) planning 
theorist, achieves enough realistic consistency to break 
down the still very much pervasive universalisation 
and technocratisation of planning theory, research 
and practice and set, thus, the triad free of ideological 
interpellations and distorted master signifiers – those 
“‘upholstery buttons’” that “construct and suture the 
ego ideal of the fledgling [as well as the ‘consolidated’] 
planner” (Gunder 2003a: 304).
4  From delusional fantasy to 
less abstract possibility
These four reviewed cases show that among planning 
theory, research and practice, rather than a synergic 
24  Gunder’s (2003a: 308) argument for “passionate planning for 
the joy of the Other’s desire in our finite world” is, in my view, a 
good example of the intrinsically imperfect, yet realistic, nature an 
analytical planning (micro-)practice ought to have and the challenge 
this encompasses.
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interconnection, linkages – for the most part when 
universal(ising) and/or technocratic(ised) theory occupies 
the commanding position of the Lacanian discourse 
– are generated that attempt to break up, subdue, 
bypass, or occlude the other two remaining elements 
of the triad, i.e. research and practice. Knowledge and 
the way it is created, consequently, evidence a specific 
“order, stability, authority and regulatory power” (Said 
2000: 239). Furthermore, the first two instances – that 
of universal(ising) and technocractic(ised) planning 
theory as the agency of, respectively, the master’s and 
the university’s discourse – suggest that the ‘master’ 
and the ‘expert’ subject-planner are actually two sides of 
the same coin, held together by means of an imaginary-
complementary relation that gives rise to a “harmonious 
totality” in which “each gives the other what the other 
lacks – each fills out the lack in the other” (Žižek 1989: 
193) (for example, when the ‘master’ subject-planner 
recourses to technocratic(ised) planning theory to 
wield research and, accordingly, spell out practice). 
The ‘idealistic’ and the ‘pragmatic’ subject-planner, by 
the same token, interrelate in a differential-symbolic 
manner to make up a ‘counteractive’ coin (i.e. one 
that rebelliously revolutionises), which defies that of 
universal(ising)/technocratic(ised) planning theory. 
To that end, the identity of both the ‘idealistic’ and the 
‘pragmatic’ subject-planner comprises their difference to 
one another (that is why the analyst (micro-)practitioner 
confronts the critical-hysterical researcher; and vice 
versa) and, far from complementing each other, the 
‘idealistic’ subject-planner takes the place of the lack 
in the ‘pragmatic’ subject-planner by embodying what 
the ‘pragmatic’ subject-planner is, precisely, in need of 
(Žižek 1989: 193 f.).
As to knowledge production, this changeover 
from ‘imaginary undisputable totality’ to ‘symbolic 
differential pragmatism’ implies refraining from (the 
creation of) universal truths and values (i.e. alienating 
master signifiers). It, likewise, refers planning theorists, 
researchers and practitioners, by means of both the 
hysteric’s and the analyst’s discourse, to their own 
desires, “embodied in the fantasies imbricated in its 
own response” (Bracher 1993: 79), as the foundation for 
new non-alienating master signifiers to be established 
(Gunder 2003a: 304). This is what, eventually, makes it 
possible to not only resist but also fight universalisation 
and technocratisation, because “when we pass from the 
perversion to the analytic social link, the agent (analyst) 
reduces himself to the void, which provokes the subject 
into confronting the truth of his desire. Knowledge in the 
position of ‘truth’ […] refers to the supposed knowledge 
Theory
(Master’s discourse)
(occluded)
Research
determines directly Practice
bypasses
Agent: Universal(ising) theory (master signifier, S1 | ‘master’ subject-planner) Ideological upshot: ‘Concealed’ big Other
The inconsistent universal(ising) 
theorist creates, through solipsistic 
knowledge, an undisclosed structural 
order that functions as practice’s 
inauthentic underpinning and renders  
research useless to practice.
Theory
(University’s discourse)
(manipulated)
Research
(Master’s and University’s discourse)
Practicecontrols determines
justifies
Agent: Technocratic(ised) theory (knowledge, S2 | ‘expert’ subject-planner) Ideological upshot: ‘Feigned’ big Other
The consistent technocratic(ised) 
theorist creates, through subjugated 
research, a structural order of 
appearances as practice’s 
inauthentic spearhead.
Research
(Hysteric’s discourse)
[universal(ising) and technocratic(ised)]
Theory
attempts (incessantly) to reshape Practice
challenges
Agent: Critical research (the split subject, $ | ‘idealistic’ subject-planner) Ideological upshot: Hysteria
The authentic critical-hysterical 
researcher makes both the 
universal(ising) and technocratic(ised) 
theorist feel an unease with their 
symbolic identity and unveils the ‘hidden’ 
and ‘contrived’ big Other; but, as to 
practice, remains inconsistent.
[universal(ising) and technocratic(ised)]
Theory
Practice
(Analyst’s discourse)
rearranges the (alleged) fixity of the 
(manipulated) Researchunveils
(critical) Researchconfronts
reacts upon-animates
Planning theory-
research-practice ‘triad’
defies
Agent: Micro-practice(s) (the surplus enjoyment, a | ‘pragmatic’ subject-planner) Ideological upshot: Subjective destitution
The authentic micro-practitioner, 
through the de-hystericisation of the 
universal(ising) and 
technocratic(ised) theorist, achieves 
the consistency necessary to break 
down their universalisation and 
technocratisation of planning 
theory, research and practice and 
set, thus, the triad free.
Figure 2: Relationships among elements of the planning theory-research-practice triad according to type of agent and discourse 
deployed together with their respective ideological upshot
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of the analyst, and, simultaneously, signals that the 
knowledge gained here will not be the neutral objective 
knowledge of scientific adequacy, but the knowledge 
that concerns the subject (analysand) in the truth of 
his subjective position” (Žižek 2006c). From such a 
‘subjective position’ the planning theorist, on the one 
hand, has to forge a shift from “‘knowing the better future 
already’” to “‘what needs to be, but cannot be known’”, 
and the planning practitioner, on the other hand, “from 
planning content and process to planning conditions, 
in which the intended developments might or might not 
occur, or could take a different course” (Boelens/de 
Roo 2016: 47; italics in the original). And the planning 
researcher, all the while, is reconciling the two in constant 
‘Brownian motion’.
Moreover, stripping off the ‘appearances’ of 
universal(ising)/technocratic(ised) planning theory’s 
ideological big Other, is, in effect, the conundrum of 
politics and the idea of utopia, for, as Jameson (2005) 
sustains, utopia is only a critique of the prevailing 
ideology. Hence, the planner’s “subjective destitution”, 
triggered by critical-hysterical planning research and 
eventually enabled by analytical planning (micro-)
practice, allows us to realise that, though the big Other 
is what ratifies planners and their actions, as such, 
there is, as argued by Lacan, no big Other. There is, in 
other words, no fixed and secured – as universal(ising)/
technocratic(ised) planning theorists so blatantly insist 
upon – point of reference which guarantees meaning 
to planning as a whole. Such a recognition, coupled 
with what Žižek (1991) and Zupančič (2002) refer to as 
“ethics of the Real”, may well lead the way to “planning’s 
redemption from the yoke of modernity” (Gunder 2003a: 
307).25
25  For a broader reflection on the implications of such a 
breakthrough see Gunder (2003a: 293 ff.).
Table 1: Correlation among discourse’s type, social effect, psychological factor, symbolic representation, planning utterer (i.e. ‘subject-
planner’) and ideological role.
Discourse’s typeSocial effect Psychological 
factor
Algebraic 
symbol
Planning utterer 
(‘Subject-planner’)
Ideological function
The Master’s Govern, 
command
Knowledge S1
(Master 
signifier)
Universal(ising) 
theorist
(The ‘master’)
Crafts a ‘concealed’ planning’s big Other 
(i.e. a structural hidden order) by way of 
producing solipsistic knowledge.
The University’s Educate, 
indoctrinate
Ideals S2
(Knowledge)
Technocratic(ised) 
theorist
(The ‘expert’)
Generates a ‘feigned’ planning’s big Other 
(i.e. a structural order of appearances to 
sublimate the ‘master’ subject-planner’s 
will) and preserves the gap (i.e. the 
“symbolic castration”) that prevents the 
‘master’/‘expert’ subject-planner from 
identifying with their planning’s symbolic 
mask-title.
The Hysteric’s Desire, protest Self-division $
(The split 
subject)
Critical researcher
(The ‘idealistic’)
Makes the ‘master’/‘expert’ subject-
planner feel discomfort with their symbolic 
identity (i.e. it triggers hysteria) and 
thus exposes planning’s ‘unseen’ and 
‘contrived’ big Other.
The Analyst’s Analyse, 
transform, 
revolutionise
Jouissance a
(The surplus 
enjoyment)
Micro-practitioner
(The ‘pragmatic’)
Enables the ‘master’/‘expert’ subject-
planner’s “subjective destitution” 
whereby the craving for symbolisation 
stops internalisation, interpretation and 
seeking for “deeper meaning”; in short, 
the obliteration of universalisation and 
technocratisation.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Bracher (1993: 53), Žižek (1996: 32), Evans (2006: 45), Žižek (2006a: 34 f.) and Žižek (2012)
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5  Not-a-conclusion: Freely 
re-dream planning up
Silent about action, theory can be empty. Ignorant of 
theory, assessments of practice can be naive (Forester 
2015: 145).
Although it is (very) customary for articles to close 
with a relatively solid and clear statement, it would 
be nothing but irremediably paradoxical should I do 
so now, for I am advocating that planning research is 
to become hysterical; that is, authentic in its inherent 
inconsistency, open to constant reinterpretation, lacking 
absolute certainty. It should not be all that startling that 
such a view be subjected to fierce criticism, after all 
“people are very narcissistically comforted by a closing 
statement or any closural gesture, by thinking we have 
understood, by wrapping things up” (Ronell 2009: 51). 
The real challenge, therefore, lies somewhere else: in 
pursuing the exact opposite, in presenting arguments 
susceptible to other elucidations (i.e. ‘to leave them 
open and radically inappropriable’) and in recognising 
that the dearth of a definitive conclusion turns out to be 
almost excruciatingly indispensable, because “admitting 
we haven’t really understood, is much less satisfying, 
more frustrating – and [yet] more necessary” (Ronell 
2009: 51). Further, as Forester (2015: 154) claims, the 
point is not to spark disapprovals, rather to provoke 
fruitful and enriching debates on improving the analysis 
of “the complexities – political, normative, institutional, 
pragmatic and more – of what a diverse range of planners 
actually do, try to do, and most importantly perhaps of 
all, might yet do”.
There is also an omnipresent risk in assuming 
that critical-hysterical (as I have put it forward here) 
reflection can only come from the ‘outside’, whatever the 
method; in the sense that it perpetuates the role of the 
academic researcher trying to decode and deconstruct 
what the practitioner does (or tries to do). There needs 
to be more impressions from those ‘out there’, ‘on the 
job’; but not in the form of mere anecdotic accounts 
(which, of course, can be deconstructed, ad infinitum, 
by scholarship), rather as a sort of self-inflicted criticism 
that can only be triggered by a sense of discomfort with 
what’s being done; by the hysterical question of “why am 
I a planner?” and “why I am doing this or that?” Then, 
a far-reaching contribution can be made to the ever-
lasting quest of figuring out how theory and practice may 
inform and animate each other more substantially and 
more palpably, for research is no longer the exclusive 
domain of – in its most ‘classical’ sense – academic 
researchers, and it is liberated to those in the field willing 
to ‘subjectively destitute’ themselves.
Another important point to clarify is that coupling 
the notions of “critical-hysterical” and “analytical micro-” 
with, respectively, planning research and practice, is 
instrumental and is not therefore an objective in and of 
itself; the focus relies on their function, and not on their 
content. They are not mere labels used to ‘baptise’ new 
planning paradigms (there are already plenty of them!). 
Rather, they are intended as means whereby existing and 
pervading planning paradigms are to be truly challenged 
and ultimately surpassed; as opposed to simply adding 
yet another layer to the historical overlapping of ‘new’ 
ways of planning that have not significantly improved the 
way planning is practiced, researched and theorised – 
i.e. they have, at the end of the day, as John Forester 
puts it in his quote above, remained both theoretically 
hollow and practically wide-eyed.26
The intention, furthermore, has not been to provide 
an anatomy of the decisive planning theory-research-
practice. The claim is that through the hysteric’s and 
the analyst’s discourse, together the ‘idealistic’ and 
‘pragmatic’ subject-planner (particularly in their ‘of 
enunciation’ dimension) could, for instance, articulate 
Ernst Bloch’s (1995 [1959]) ‘Not-Yet’ (Noch-Nicht) and 
accordingly connect the present with the future as an 
open system, as an open possibility. Given the ‘Not-Yet’ 
twofold composition – the Not-Yet-Conscious and the 
Not-Yet-Become – the ‘idealistic’ and ‘expert’ subject-
planner would be enabled to defy the perversions of the 
‘master’ and ‘expert’ subject-planner discourses and to 
come up with something different, because “the Not-Yet-
Conscious is the possibility of the new as developed in 
the unconscious of the mind” (Torrison 2015: 37). The 
future that planning is supposed to encourage is not then 
an “anticipatory consciousness [...] construed around a 
fantasy, but is developed into a concrete possibility, and 
26  A potential explanation for this may arguably be that theorising, 
researching and, consequently, practicing planning in such a 
way seems to encompass a bit of what Freud referred to as 
“transference”, provided that, while in a psychoanalytical level we 
have the tendency to brim ourselves “with the blueprint of our past 
relationships, practically bursting them on our futures” (Schwartz 
2015), planning theory and research that defy the orthodoxies 
of the past (particularly those derived from modernity) and that 
actually animate other forms of planning (micro-)practice do have 
to make their way up, because we keep ‘transferring’ the blueprints 
of previous modes of planning theory, research and practice, 
impeding thus new connections, new schemata, for the very least 
new hints that may lead to alternative theorising, research and, 
notably, practice planning.
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it is this possibility that is hinted at in the Not-Yet and 
which is later evolved” (Torrison 2015: 37).
Similarly, by way of critical-hysterical planning 
research, it is also possible to untangle transpositional 
predicaments such as “if planning is everything, 
maybe it’s nothing”, put forward by Wildavsky (1973); 
in the sense that universal(ising)/technocratic(ised) 
planning theory, through the master’s and university’s 
discourse, indeed make planning (specifically research 
and practice) simultaneously everything and nothing. 
It is through the contraposition of the statement that 
planning, too, is nothing (given the vacuousness of 
inauthentic and inconsistent universal(ising) planning 
theory) and everything (due to the capacity of this type 
of theory to either bypass or manipulate, by means 
of technocratic(ised) university’s discourse, planning 
research and, in so doing, totalise planning practice). That 
being so, it may well be alleged that critical-hysterical 
planning research surpasses such a quandary and 
turns planning neither into nothing nor into everything, 
but instead into something, something meaningful, 
something that confronts hysterically, through critical 
research, universal(ising)/technocratic(ised) planning’s 
ideological big Other – and, through analytical (micro-)
practice, outdoes its perversion. In the long run, a truly 
revolutionary and radical mode of planning theory-
research-practice can be asserted, because “hysteria is 
much more subversive than perversion; a pervert has no 
uncertainties, while [...] the hysterical position is that of 
doubt, which is an extremely productive position: all new 
invention comes from hysterical questions” (Žižek 2012, 
italics added).
Moreover, relating ‘hysterical’ and ‘analytical’ 
planning theory, research and planning to one another 
so that they do not end up being an unrecognisable 
totalising unity, requires that the triad be devoid of 
the action-reaction equalisation; though bearing in 
mind that this instance might never be fully achieved. 
In other words, uncertainty, and the anxiety it cannot 
help but to bring about, has to be fully embraced when 
theorising, researching and practicing planning. This, 
too, represents an ethical stance, because “if we’re not 
anxious, if we’re ok with things, then we’re not trying to 
explore or figure anything out. Anxiety is the mood par 
excellence of ethnicity” (Ronell 2009: 49). Though all 
this reasoning may sound a bit ambiguous, let us not 
forget that “most ambiguities […] hold things together 
in dynamic tension; they don’t imply uncertainty but 
convey honesty; they don’t lack clarity but express 
tension, essential contradictions that form a necessary 
totality, tensions that must be conveyed and addressed, 
sometimes sustained. Such provides a richer meaning to 
words and actions, and to politics” (Merrifield 2015: 760) 
– so why not then infuse the planning theory-research-
practice triad with ‘hysterical ambiguity’ and start to freely 
re-dream planning up?
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